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his article is a critique of neo-liberal 
inspired policies such as Public-Private 
Partnerships (PPPs), privatisation of 
services and Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) with specific 
reference to the Buffalo City and Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipalities in 
the Eastern Cape. The two selected 
municipalities were chosen because both 
of them are categorized as metropolitan. 
This will enable the research to make a 
comparison of the implementation of PPP, 
outsourcing of services and BBBEE at these 
metropoles. The article provides an 
analysis of both municipalities’ records 
such as policy documents. The central 
argument of this article is that the neo-
liberal inspired policies of PPP and BBBEE 
that are being applied through Local 
Economic Development (LED) are not in 
the interests of the majority of people 
living in the Eastern Cape. The researchers 
argue that the local business and political 
elites through the BBBEE, PPPs and 
outsourcing of services are using their 
strong networks (associated political, social 
and capital resources) in their efforts for 
personal accumulation, rather than 
promoting development for the majority. 
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Introduction  
The purpose of this article is to examine the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of two 
selected municipalities in the Eastern Cape. This will be done by providing a closer 
examination of the extent of BBBEE, PPPs and the outsourcing of services in Buffalo City 
and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality. Moreover, this will include examining 
their theoretical underpinnings, and the documents/legislations which set them up, their 
objectives, the extent of their use, their possible incompatibility and any formal 
evaluation of them which have been carried out in two metropolitan municipalities in the 
Eastern Cape. The authors concentrate on PPPs and BBBEE as strategies of local 
governments to create employment and accelerate economic growth. It must be borne 
in mind that all the conceptual issues pointed out above are directly linked to the central 
argument of the article that the neo-liberal inspired policies of PPPs and BBBEE that are 
being applied through LED are not in the interests of the majority of people living in the 
Eastern Cape. Again, this article is aimed at examining whether neo-liberalism as a model 
of development is seen to be able to eradicate poverty, create jobs, and promote 
development; or only benefit a tiny minority of people (mainly well-connected business 
people) who are associated with the ruling party in the municipalities under the spotlight 
in this article. The writer argues that PPPs, outsourcing of services and BBBEE are an 
application of neo-liberalism at local government level; precisely because they are 
‘market friendly’ and are elevating the role of the ‘market forces’ over municipalities by 
promoting privatisation of services.     
Neo-liberalism is a model of development which is based on elevating ‘market forces’ 
over the state. The neo-liberals believe that only business can bring about development 
in society. A strong state is regarded as a cause of lack of development in society 
precisely because it prevents economic growth from occurring. Sometimes neo-liberalism 
is referred to as ‘market fundamentalism’. Neo-liberal policies are meant to attract 
investment, and stimulate business through deregulation, with the assumption that there 
will be a trickle-down effect to the poor (Castells, 2000:137).  
Neo-liberalism is, among other things, a model for development. It has goals for 
economic development and poverty eradication. Proponents of the neo-liberal school of 
thought argue that economic growth through the free market system leads to economic 
as well as social development, for example poverty relief in society. They believe that this 
can only happen when there is privatisation, removal of tariffs, policies in trade bilateral 
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agreements, welcoming of foreign investors from First World countries and a relaxation 
of labour laws. Supporters of neo-liberal ideas hold a view that ‘big government’ or a 
large public sector with heavy state regulation is not the best practice for economic 
growth and the creation of jobs, because investors are normally not keen to invest in a 
country that has heavy state regulation (Breakfast, 2013:39). Many governments in the 
world are encouraged by multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to implement privatisation of services at the municipal 
level (Chomsky, 2010:91). 
 
Local Government: Integrated Development Plan (IDP) 
The African National Congress (ANC) used the Reconstruction and Development 
Program (RDP) as an election manifesto in 1994 to come to power. The rationale behind 
this social policy was to address the socio-economic problems created by colonialism 
and apartheid. The RDP was a ‘Brain Child’ of the Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), an alliance partner of the ANC and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP). However a neo-liberal macro-economic policy called Growth Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) was introduced in 1996 to largely replace the RDP. This had 
implications for all levels of government in terms of the theoretical underpinnings of 
development (Bond, 2006:253-254).  
For instance, this change at macro-economic level meant that local government in 
South Africa had to have elements of neo-liberalism in the policy framework. There is a 
link between the GEAR policy and the IDP, both of which were introduced in the same 
year in 1996 (Growth, Employment and Redistribution, 1996:8-7). The IDP is a five-year 
strategic planning document for all South African municipalities (White Paper on Local 
Government, 1998: 26-28).  
The IDP is the focus of the South African municipalities in the new South Africa with 
the aim of intergovernmental planning and proper coordination. Moreover, the IDP was 
a response to socio-economic challenges facing the post-apartheid government- 
specifically, the need for a new model of local government. The nature and content of 
the IDP is strongly restricted by the international debate and practice which prevailed at 
the time of its policy introduction (Harrison, 2006:186, Asmah-Andoh 2009:104).  
The IDP outlines the visions for municipalities with regard to the needs of all the 
people in the municipality. Municipalities should link their IDPs with the development 
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plans of the provincial and national government. The IDP should reflect the thinking of 
the municipal council on how they are planning to end underdevelopment (White Paper 
on Local Government, 1998: 26-28). The implementation of the IDP requires expert 
persons who have the technical skills to render services to the people (Malefane, 
2009:166, Van der Walt, 2007:60). This is an important aspect regarding service delivery 
at local government level. It is practically impossible for municipalities to end poverty if 
they do not employ the right people within their institutions. The whole notion of a 
developmental state cannot be realized without a committed public service. A 
developmental state is a state that drives development.  
Another factor which is a problem pertaining to the IDP is that it is market driven. 
The IDP was an idea that emanated from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank during the early 1990s. The IMF, World Bank, USA, England, Germany and 
academics local and international coined the concept of the IDP by encouraging 
municipalities on a global scale to privatise their services (Blakely and Leigh, 2010:215, 
Phutiagae, 2007:133). Neo-liberalism is at the heart of the IDP (Harrison, 2006:188). This 
means that the private sector should take the lead with regard to development at local 
government. The assumption is that this will lead to a trickling-down effect. However, 
the reality shows that the implementation of the IDP leaves much to be desired at local 
government level because poverty is increasing in many communities to a large extent. 
Corruption is another cause of underdevelopment. This means that the money that is 
allocated for services for the people ends up in the back pockets of officials and 
politicians. There are many factors that cause officials in local government to engage in 
unethical behaviour. Firstly, municipalities in the new South Africa are perceived by many 
people to be a terrain of accumulation for personal wealth. Secondly, due to a consistent 
increase of the scale of salaries of public officials and politicians, a number of people see 
this as an opportunity of living a good life (Bond, 2002:4).  
It must be noted that this does not imply that people must not be rewarded for their 
hardwork. However, this should not happen at the expense of the majority of the people. 
With reference to corruption, according to the Auditor-General (2008/9), only four 
municipalities out of 284 throughout the country obtained clean audits or unqualified 
reports. More specifically, in the Eastern Cape 94 percent of the municipalities had 
unauthorized, fruitless and wasteful expenditure in the 2010/2011 financial year (Auditor-
General, 2010-2011:48). All the municipalities (45) in the Eastern Cape received unclean 
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reports (Auditor-General, 2010-2011:48). This shows the extent of corruption within the 
context of local government in South Africa. The National Planning Commission 
Diagnostic Report (2011:25) acknowledges that corruption is embedded in the public 
sector in South Africa, particularly at local government level. Among other things, this is 
due to a shortage of critical skills in areas such as financial management, a lack of good 
work ethic and poor leadership (National Planning Commission Diagnostic Report, 
2011:25). The next area of discussion will focus on the LED policy and how it is 
implemented in parallel with the IDP at local government in South Africa.  
 
Local Economic Development (LED)  
By and large, LED is the coming together of business, community-based organizations 
and government with the aim of tackling unemployment, accelerating economic growth 
and the eradication of poverty at the municipal level. Within the South African context 
LED refers to initiatives undertaken at local government by different partners to address 
socio-economic problems, etc. LED has of late become the responsibility of 
municipalities working alongside different sectors of the society. LED is concerned about 
the economic stability of municipalities. Furthermore, LED in the main focuses on the 
creation of jobs by attracting foreign direct investment in order to meet the needs of the 
inhabitants (Blakely and Leigh, 2010:215, Phutiagae, 2007:133). 
According to the White Paper on Local Government (1998: 26-28), the LED strategy is 
meant to provide high level short and medium-term economic interventions to address 
the socio-economic problems in the South African municipalities. This economic strategy 
is informed by the IDP. This implies that LED is implemented alongside the IDP, and that 
LED is an outcome of IDP. Over and above, the IDP is a broad-policy framework and LED 
is a strategy for economic development.    
There are five key objectives of LED: 
 Creating employment for the inhabitants. 
 Stimulating income levels of the employed in order for them to pay service 
charges. 
 Improving the quality of the lives of people of a particular municipality. 
 Improving human resource development of government departments at the 
municipal level. 
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 Growing the economy in order to meet developmental challenges (IRI and NBI, 
1998:3). 
Against the above background, the policy objectives of the LEDs in South Africa are 
not realized due to corruption and market friendly policies at the municipal level. Market 
friendly in this context refer to policies that are meant for acquisition of wealth by few 
individuals. It must be borne in mind that the LED is linked to the GEAR-neo-liberal 
policy because municipalities throughout South Africa are outsourcing or privatizing 
services. The GEAR policy supports privatization, fiscal discipline, flexible labour laws 
through deregulation of the market and trade liberalization (removal of tariffs from 
imports coming into the country) and public-private partnerships. It is a business-friendly 
policy focusing on attracting foreign direct investment to grow the economy with the 
assumption that there will be a trickling-down effect. Foreign direct investment was to 
be attracted by lowering taxes paid by private institutions (Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution, 1996:8-16). 
At government level, this means that neo-liberalism is at the heart of LED; because of 
the connection between the GEAR policy and LED as pointed out above. The assumption 
is that if the local economy grows, that will filter down to the inhabitants of a particular 
area. According to Blakely and Leigh, economic growth and the creation of jobs are not 
a problem. However, they go on to say that ‘…it is a great mistake to equate economic 
growth with economic development’ (2010:74). This means that the economy can grow 
even though poverty and unemployment are not reduced.  
The application of neo-liberalism within the context of local government is also 
influenced by the IMF and World Bank via the LED among other things. For instance, 
municipalities are expected to reduce their government expenditure through 
privatization of services (Breakfast, 2013:25). The notion of privatisation of services is 
rooted in LED strategies. Poor communities are not able to access free services due to 
privatisation of services. The concept of free-services is disappearing in South African 
municipalities due to elements of neo-liberalism (McDonald and Pape 2003:28; Bond 
2002:4).   
 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Policy 
This section will examine the economic strategy of the ANC to redress the imbalances of 
the past. The writers will, among other things, discuss how this strategy links to LED. This 
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policy is called Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment. The rationale behind BBBEE 
was to enhance the economic participation of black people. The ruling party was given a 
mandate by the people to redress the disparities created by the previous regime. The 
main aim of BBBEE is to distribute wealth equitably in post-apartheid South Africa 
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2004:3-7). In as much as outsourcing of services and 
PPPs are part of a dimension of neo-liberalism, BBBEE is not easily associated with it. For 
instance, municipalities may retain similar formal procurement procedures and policies 
without privatizing services, and may add an extra provision concerning procurement. It 
is a business-friendly policy meant for maximization of profit and individual acquisition 
of wealth, but it has been applied in conjunction with some distinctly different policies in 
respect of racial preferences, and very strong labour protection. The link between the 
business and political elites with regard to BBBEE deals will be indicated through 
evidence-based material in this section and will be further highlighted in other sections 
in this article as well. 
According to Bond (2005:39), BBBEE is an application of neo-liberalism because it is 
meant among other things to promote privatization of services or PPPs in the public 
sector. More often than not in South Africa both BBBEE and PPPs are hybridized. For 
instance, PPPs often involve BBBEE enterprises. The South African government 
established a Code of Good Practice for BBBEE in PPPs at local government (National 
Treasury RSA, 2005: 43-44). Hence, the writers argue that BBBEE is not neo-liberal per se, 
it is inspired by neo-liberalism in its practice in the sense that it is meant to create a 
large middle class in order for this class to run the economy. The assumption is that the 
economic benefits of economic growth will be felt by the poor on the ground. By so 
doing, jobs and poverty will be addressed by the trickle-down effect. Large businesses in 
South Africa hold a view that there is a need to create a big black middle class as a 
buffer against socialists or communists. This concept of creating a black middle and a 
capitalist class was also associated with the former President of South Africa, Thabo 
Mbeki. The motivation behind this idea was to create proper lines of communication 
between big business and politicians (Butler, 2009:76; Pottinger, 2008:214). 
BBBEE is one of the broader strategies of the ANC government, intended to 
deracialize public institutions, create employment, reduce poverty, speed up land reform 
and accelerate service delivery at all levels of government. BBBEE has been justified by 
the ruling party in South Africa in order to bring about the deracialization of the 
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economy. The government standpoint is that BBBEE should be a way of transforming the 
South African economy (Balshaw and Goldberg, 2005:73, Turok, 2008:140, Butler, 
2009:75).  
According to Balshaw and Goldberg (2005:21), Broad-based Black Economic 
Empowerment has seven pillars which are: 
 Enterprise development  
 Preferential Procurement  
 Skills development 
 Employment equity 
 Management and control 
 Equity ownership 
 Resident element  
The BBBEE policy was signed into law by the former president of South Africa, Thabo 
Mbeki, in early 2004. The acceptance of BBBEE was aimed at reducing poverty, 
unemployment, and disparities between the rich and the poor and, amongst other 
things, the aims of BBBEE included ‘to change the racial composition of ownership and 
management structures of enterprises… and increase ownership and management by 
communities, workers and cooperatives’. The above assertion explains why the South 
African government saw a need to develop a broad-based approach of Black Economic 
Empowerment. This policy has the Department of Trade and Industry to introduce the 
‘Codes of Good Practice’, which provide a framework on how the Broad-based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act should be implemented. Government has introduced a 
scorecard to measure companies (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004:3-7, Gumede 
2008:298, 2005:231, Turok, 2008:148).  
The Black Economic Empowerment scorecard is used to measure companies when 
they want to do business with the government of the day. The scorecard is also applied 
when it comes to procurement of state services at all levels. With respect to BBBEE 
recipients it includes Africans, Indians and Coloureds (Balshaw and Goldberg, 2005:73). 
These are the components of BBBEE in terms of the implementation of the policy.   
It is of paramount importance to ask whether BBBEE has achieved its policy 
intentions or not? There has been a public outcry by all political parties across the 
political spectrum with reference to BBBEE. These political organizations have argued 
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very strongly that BBBEE is benefiting only those who are close to the ruling party. 
Interestingly, the ANC has on a number of occasions acknowledged that this policy does 
not produce the expected outcomes. The Minister of Higher Education and Secretary 
General of the South African Communist Party has publicly criticized BBBEE as inspired 
by neo-liberalism. His argument has been that this policy only creates a tiny minority of 
rich black people.  
According to Houghteling (2010:20) citing Robinson, ‘as a 2004 report by Time 
magazine reported, 8 of the top 10 largest BEE transactions in 2003 involved just three 
men, all with ANC connections’. Moeletsi Mbeki follows the same line of thinking when 
he points out that BBBEE has benefited a few people who are all politically connected. 
He goes on to say that BBBEE has turned ANC politicians into overnight millionaires and 
billionaires in the new South Africa (2009:61). Companies that are well connected 
politically are the real recipients of BBBEE. The BBBEE policy has been a mechanism for 
the personal enrichment of individuals having links with the ruling party. For instance, a 
company called KopanoKeMatla with strong links to COSATU benefited from the 
Gauteng Freeway e-tolling system through a BBBEE and PPP deal which costs 20 billion 
rands (Ndlangisa and Rossouw, 2012:2). COSATU has shares in this company that 
benefited in the construction of toll roads in Gauteng with Raubex (also a construction 
company) (ibid).   
It must be borne in mind that COSATU is in political alliance with the ruling party 
and the SACP. This means that if COSATU does business or benefits from BBBEE and PPP 
that is tantamount to corruption because of its political relationship with the ANC 
government. The Gauteng e-tolling system was introduced without any process of public 
participation. Concerned citizens in Gauteng took the provincial government to court, 
challenging the decision to introduce the e-tolling system. The court ruled that the 
government should put its plan with regard to the e-tolling system on hold and start the 
process of public participation. 
WaAfrika and Hofstatter state that the Gauteng e-tolling system also benefited 
companies with strong political links with the ruling party. Among others, this includes 
Valli Moosa’s company (former minister and senior member of the ANC). There is a new 
syndrome amongst people in post-apartheid South Africa of getting rich quickly at all 
costs. However, this does not mean that all black people think along these lines. Those 
who are politically connected, who do not work hard to acquire wealth are sending the 
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wrong message to the black youth that one can get rich without working hard, precisely 
because they see from the older ones how they have acquired wealth.  
It is evident that BBBEE has not reduced the gap between rich and the poor, because 
it has benefited a few people who have strong liberation credentials or family or friends 
within the state machinery. According to research conducted by Holborn (of the South 
African Institute of Race Relations), the Gini co-efficient (a parameter that examines 
disparities) indicates that inequality in South Africa has increased since 1996. She goes 
on to say that the Gini co-efficient was 0.62 when the GEAR policy was adopted in 1996. 
However, in 2009 it increased to 0.65. Additionally, in 2009 the racial group with the 
lowest Gini co-efficient in South Africa was white people with a measure of about 0.45. 
Disparity was worse among black people, with a co-efficient of about 0.68 (2010:181). 
Moreover, the measurement for economic development used by the United Nations, 
known as Human Development Index, indicates that South Africa’s HDI is 0.619; this 
results in South Africa being ranked 123 out of 187 countries in the world (UNDP, 
2012:5). This signifies the extent of underdevelopment in South Africa despite the fact 
that anti-poverty strategies such as BBBEE and PPP have been introduced in the new 
South Africa to promote development.  
BBBEE does not benefit the poorest of the poor in particular in rural areas. Instead, it 
leads to tender corruption at all levels of government. A number of BBBEE beneficiaries 
hold senior positions in the ruling party. Sometimes ANC politicians, ministers and public 
servants use BBBEE to become board members in different private companies while they 
are holding public office (Turok, 2009:163).  According to Brummer and McKune, the BEE 
consortium associated with Mvelaphanda Holdings also has strong political links with 
Human Settlements Minister Tokyo Sexwale and won a R10 billion tender due to the 
political influence of Sexwale; and his Director-General Thabane Zulu who served on the 
tendering committee. This tender was awarded by the South African Social Security 
Agency in January 2012 (ibid).  
Similarly, the Pillay Commission found that four senior politicians of the ruling party 
(Stone Sizani, Makhenkesi Stofile, Enoch Godongwana and Mcebisi Jonas) had been 
involved in corruption. More specifically, the families of these politicians according to the 
Pillay report were alleged to have benefited by about R200-million illegally while doing 
business with the Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC) then headed by 
Mcebisi Jonas (Pillay Report, 2008:1-5). Again, tenders amounting to R62 million in the 
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Eastern Cape municipalities were awarded to companies that have links with public 
officials and politicians in the 2010/2011 financial year (Auditor-General, 2010/2011:64). 
This shows that the business and political elites through the BBBEE, PPPs, and the 
outsourcing of services are using their strong networks (associated political, social capital 
resources) in their efforts for personal accumulation of wealth. Again, this shows the 
linkages of such practices to the construction and reproduction of neo-liberal discourses 
at different levels of government. The next section will examine the PPP model and how 
it is implemented alongside BBBEE in the South African context. 
 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
There has been an increase in the frequency of the use of the PPP model in post-
apartheid service delivery. This model is embraced by ASGISA (Accelerated and Shared 
Growth Initiative of South Africa) and the Department of Finance component of National 
Treasury. The increase of the usage of the PPPs in South Africa is a result of the Public 
Finance Management Act which was passed in 1999, and which supports the 
implementation of PPPs.  
It must be noted that at local government level the practice of PPPs is supported by 
the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 through its guidelines. The 
motivation behind the PPP model was to make service provision cheaper. Instead of 
government itself rendering the services, it gives some of its responsibilities to the 
private sector in terms of services delivery (National Treasury RSA, 1996:83). The South 
African Government has developed a policy framework that makes it possible for 
municipal, provincial and national institutions to engage in Public-Private agreements. A 
Code of Good Practice gives clear guidelines about each element of private companies’ 
BBBEE equity structure, management, subcontracting, and local socio-economic 
development (National Treasury RSA, 2005: 43-44). 
Furthermore, the PPPs emanate from GEAR, the macro-economic policy of 
government. This policy is premised on the fact that economic development can only be 
promoted by the private sector. Blakely and Leigh argue that the PPP concept has 
permanently entered the language of local government. They go on to ask two 
interesting questions: What is meant by the PPP concept? Why is this model used for 
economic development? (2010:401). Responding to these questions, PPP is the coming 
together of both public and private institutions with an aim of rendering services to the 
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people. Business takes the lead in providing services and does the work for profit. 
Secondly, the use of PPPs signifies that governments across the globe who are following 
market-fundamentalist policies subscribe to the notion that economic development can 
only be brought about through market forces. There are a number of municipalities in 
the new South Africa that are employing the PPPs with respect to service delivery. This 
model is normally used in the construction of roads, installation of electricity, sanitation, 
water supply and waste disposal sites (IRI and NBI, 1998:20). 
There are five countries that have influenced the PPP model. These countries include 
England, United States of America, Ireland, Australia and Canada. Governments in many 
parts of the world are turning to private institutions for service delivery for their people. 
The model of PPP is normally a long-term arrangement between government and 
private institutions. The South African Government in the post-apartheid South Africa era 
has supported the implementation of PPPs for service delivery in all spheres. Throughout 
the country, municipalities within their LED plans are embracing the PPPs. A number of 
functions that were previously provided by government are now carried out by private 
institutions (Freund and Lootvoet, 2006:267, Binza, 2009:42, Dutz, Harris, Dhingra and 
Shugart, 2010:1).   
This approach signifies that the government of the day depends on the private sector 
for service delivery in post-apartheid South Africa. Private institutions enter into these 
agreements with the aim of maximization of profit. PPPs are at the heart of the LED 
strategies of municipalities. Municipalities in South Africa are rendering services such as 
infrastructural development, installation of electricity, water reading and recovery of debt 
payments via the private sector (Freund and Lootvoet, 2006:267, Blakely and Leigh, 
2010:401). This implies that municipalities in the new South Africa are largely being run 
like commercial institutions. This also means that poor people will not access certain 
services because they are poor and do not have money to pay for services rendered by 
private companies.  
South African and international private companies are normally the participants of 
PPPs through the creation of consortia. This is done to promote the implementation of 
BBBEE at all levels of state institutions (USAID, 2010:24). There is an interesting 
phenomenon in this regard, in that a number of private white-owned companies are 
‘fronting’ or using black people in order to enter into PPPs. This means that sometimes 
black people in townships and informal settlements are given positions in white 
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companies to become directors despite the fact that they have no say in the company[s]. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that all white private companies are doing fronting. 
This is precisely because BBBEE requires a certain number of black people in private 
companies. Against this background, one can conclude that PPPs and BBBEE create the 
scope for rampant corruption. For example, Coega’s former chief financial officer, Allan 
Young, was fired for reporting that the CEO Pepi Silinga owes Coega about R170 000 for 
money that was paid to his trust for consultancy work that his company claimed to have 
done for Coega, despite the fact that his trust was deregistered at the time (Sokana, 
2009:1). This shows that neo-liberalism in practice is contradictory in nature as it involves 
the allocation of state resources to politically influential individuals rather than 
promoting economic development for the majority. It must be noted that Coega is a PPP 
model of development.  
The next section will examine specifically the socio-economic conditions of both 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Buffalo City; because these two 
metropolitan municipalities in the Eastern Cape are used as case studies in this chapter. 
The two selected municipalities in this chapter were chosen because both of them are 
categorized as metropolitan and this will enable the researchers to make a comparison 
of the implementation of neo-liberal inspired policies at these metropoles. 
 
The socio-economic conditions of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality and Buffalo City 
 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
According to the Nelson Mandela Municipality (2010:7), the Municipality has a total 
population of 1,1 million inhabitants. By and large, the population of the metro is 
constituted by a majority of young people, with 37% of residents between the age of 15 
and 34 years, indicating that education and job creation require serious attention. 
Altogether 26.2% of the population is below the age of 15 years, while 5.3% is 65 years 
and above. The male-female ratio of the population is 48:52 (ibid). The city has two 
economic strengths. First and foremost, it has two automotive industries (General Motors 
South Africa and Volkswagen South Africa). Secondly, the Metro has a seaport which 
transports goods locally and internationally (ibid). Binza (2009:154) argues along the lines 
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of the IDP of the Nelson Mandela Metro when he asserts that the city has over 40 
percent unemployed individuals who are struggling to find employment.  
According to the Nelson Mandela Municipality (2010:8), unemployment (40%) and 
poverty (32.5%) have reached high proportions. Holborn (2010:239) of the South African 
Institute of Race Relations states that, on the whole unemployment in the Eastern Cape 
Province constitutes 41.5% at the moment. According to the Nelson Mandela 
Municipality (2011:12-14), in the early 1990s the municipality had 0% of outsourced 
services and PPPs, however, at the present moment outsourced services are about 60%, 
and 30% of the services are effected through the PPP model in the metro. Moreover, 
after the creation of the Nelson Mandela Metro in 2000 there were about 13 000 
employees, while at this juncture there are only about 7 000 employees (ibid). This 
shows that there has been a decrease in terms of employment in the metro since the 
implementation of outsourced services and the PPPs. The bulk of the work is done by 
private companies instead of the municipality for the whole metro. This is the hallmark 
of the application of neo-liberalism, elevating the business community above the state. 
With regard to service delivery, according to Lebone (2010:591), of the South African 
Institute of Race Relations, 7.4 % of people are using a bucket system, 13.7% of people 
are living in informal houses, 9% of the people still do not have electricity and 98.4% 
have access to water in the Nelson Mandela Metro. This indicates that much more needs 
to be done with regard to service delivery.  
The application of neo-liberalism is rooted in both, the IDP and LED plans of the 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality, because PPPs are perceived by the local 
political elites to be a strategy of poverty eradication, job creation and service delivery as 
outlined in the IDP document of the NMMM. However, as stated earlier in this section 
poverty (32.5%) and unemployment (40%) are very high in this metro (IDP of Nelson 
Mandela Municipality, 2010:8). There are township areas in the Nelson Mandela Metro 
such as Kwazakhele where unemployment is over 50% (Cherry and Haines, 2010:12). This 
implies that the PPPs are not achieving their intended policy objectives. According to 
Dimant (2010:109) of the South African Institute of Race Relations, in 1996 poverty in 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality was at 29.9%, however at the moment it is 
32%. This means that poverty in this municipality has increased since the ‘GEAR project’ 
was introduced by the South African government.  
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Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality 
According to Buffalo City Municipality (2011:1), this municipality was established in 2000 
during the transitional phase of a number of municipalities in South Africa. Buffalo City 
includes the political integration of East London (it has a number of economic activities 
such as automotive sector, Daimler Chrysler South Africa, which manufactures Mercedes 
Benz); King Williams Town and Bisho (the political centre of the administration the 
Eastern Cape provincial government) (see also the ‘Integrated Development Plan Review 
of Buffalo City 2010-2011’). ‘About 880 000 people live in Buffalo City. More than 80% 
are African, approximately 10% are white, 6% are Coloured and just under 2% are Asian. 
Another interesting fact is that the population comprises of 48% men and 52% females 
which is the same as for the country as a whole. Critical features of the region lie in 
glaring demographic realities of a high rural population (35%), 73% of the people of 
Buffalo City are poorly paid and there is a high unemployment rate (53%). As a 
consequence, the gross domestic product is substantially less than the national average 
(Buffalo City Municipality, 2011:3).  
According to Maphazi (2012:23), 73% of the people of Buffalo City think that the 
municipality is failing to render services to its inhabitants. This speaks volumes about the 
state of affairs with regard to services delivery in Buffalo City. The majority of the people 
of the municipality believe that the municipality is failing them in terms of service 
delivery. According to Buffalo City Municipality (2011:24-27), in the early 1990s the 
municipality had 0% of outsourced services and PPPs, however, at the present moment 
outsourced services are at about 55%, and 20% of the services in the metro are 
delivered through the PPP model. Moreover, after the creation of the Buffalo City 
Municipality in 2000 there were about 11 000 employees, however, at the moment there 
are about 6 000 employees in the metro (ibid).   
The PPPs in the Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality are used as an economic 
strategy by the powers that be to grow the local economy, create jobs and render 
services. However the 2010/2011 document of the IDP of Buffalo City outlines that 
poverty (35.3%) and unemployment (50%) as indicated above in this section are very 
high in this area. Again, the utilization of the PPPs in this metro signifies that the 
political elites of Buffalo City are employing neo-liberalism as a model of development. It 
is worth noting that PPPs are implemented alongside BBBEE. According to Dimant 
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(2010:109) of the South African Institute of Race Relations, in 1996 poverty in Buffalo 
City was 33.5%, however at this juncture it stands at 35.3%. This implies that poverty in 




The purpose of this article was to examine the state of affairs of local government in 
post-apartheid South Africa. Coupled with this was a closer examination of policies such 
as BBBEE and PPPs. It must be noted that in as much as PPPs certainly are an element of 
neo-liberalism in the public sector, BBBEE is not easily associated with it. Municipalities, 
in terms of government policy, may retain the same formal procurement procedures 
without necessarily outsourcing more than before, and add further provisions that BBBEE 
enterprises should receive preferential treatment in the allocation of outsourced 
contracts. As such this represents greater government regulation not less, and cannot be 
unproblematically equated with neo-liberalism, though they may be heavily influenced 
by it.  
 Various documents demonstrate that both BBBEE and PPPs have benefited only a 
tiny minority of people linked to the ruling party (the ANC).  Neo-liberalism in practice is 
contradictory in nature as it involves the allocation of state resources to politically 
influential individuals rather than promoting economic development for the majority. 
Privatisation of services at local government level has influenced the rise of anti-neo-
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